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For the kingdom of heaven is like unto a man that was a householder, who went 
out early in the morning to hire laborers into his vineyard. 20:2 And when he 
had agreed with the laborers for a shilling a day, he sent them into his vineyard. 
20:3 And he went out about the third hour, and saw others standing in the 
marketplace idle; 20:4 and to them he said, Go ye also into the vineyard, and 
whatsoever is right I will give you. And they went their way. 20:5 Again he went 
out about the sixth and the ninth hour, and did likewise. 20:6 And about the 
eleventh hour he went out, and found others standing; and he saith unto them, 
Why stand ye here all the day idle? 20:7 They say unto him, Because no man hath 
hired us. He saith unto them, Go ye also into the vineyard. 20:8 And when even 
was come, the lord of the vineyard saith unto his steward, Call the laborers, and 
pay them their hire, beginning from the last unto the first. 20:9 And when they 
came that were hired about the eleventh hour, they received every man a shilling. 
20:10 And when the first came, they supposed that they would receive more; 
and they likewise received every man a shilling. 20:11 And when they received it, 
they murmured against the householder, 20:12 saying, These last have spent but 
one hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us, who have borne the burden 
of the day and the scorching heat. 20:13 But he answered and said to one of 
them, Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst not thou agree with me for a shilling? 
20:14 Take up that which is thine, and go thy way; it is my will to give unto this 
last, even as unto thee. 20:15 Is it not lawful for me to do what I will with mine 
own? or is thine eye evil, because I am good? 20:16 So the last shall be first, and 
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I
Who are the people of the “last hour”, of the one hour but last since the 
gospel calls them those of the “eleventh hour”, silent disturbers, whom others 
do not seem to like, people whose role in St. Matthew’s parable is to irritate and 
disturb the order of the day, a grain of sand in the otherwise perfectly working 
machine of the everyday? A first tentative answer could be that it is simply “us”, 
people of the times which, at least since 1960s, have seen themselves in situations 
of various “posts-”. Such qualifications as poststructuralism, postmodernism, 
postmarxism, postsecularism, and posthumanism are all terms which render 
contemporary ramifications of Friedrich Hölderlin’s famous claim that we 
are late comers. Hölderlin’s wir kommen zu spät marks the beginning of the 
eleventh hour which seems to be the time allotted to those have come too late, 
that is our time. One may be tempted to sigh with Legolas: “Alas for us all! 
And for all that walk the world in these after-days” (Tolkien, 1975: 490). Yet, 
this cryptic phrase “too late” refers also, we would like to believe, to something 
more important than a position in the development of human history. Zu spät 
signifies also a certain crisis of thinking, a deconstructive turn which wants 
thinking to inspect with suspicion all dualisms, the process of “mundunizing 
of philosophy – the rejection of dualisms in favor of an immanence viewed as 
more and more absolute”, which, in turn, “implies a profound discontinuity 
with its [philosophy’s] traditionally speculative form” (Esposito, 2012: 157). 
“Too late”, at the eleventh hour, indicates a necessity of approaching the world in 
a way both similar and different from the one practiced so far. Similar – because 
thinking never abandons its tendency towards searching for foundations, and 
different – because these foundations are now to be looked for in a realm which 
can be generally described as “life” rather than, for instance, transcendence. Yet, 
the rejection of dualisms suggests that materiality reality never fills completely 
the space of our thinking, that “there is always a little opening, something left 
over, a line of flight along which the vision of things can appear differently 
from what is there” (Esposito, 2012: 123). Comparing, we want to believe, 
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II
Why do we read this parable here and today? What does it teach us, people 
of “these after-days”? First, it demonstrates that we do not have direct access 
to what determines the direction of our life and what supervises the way in 
which we organize our world. What else is this “kingdom of heaven”, Basileia 
ton Ouranon, if not a realm of sense and order which serves as a directive and 
corrective of our ways here, in the earthly kingdoms of these after-days. And 
yet this most important sphere upon which everything seems to depend cannot 
unfold before us, and we have to approach it only indirectly, obliquely. The name 
of this tangential approach is comparison. We can try to understand the ideal 
organization of our living together (this is what, I believe, the “kingdom of 
heaven” tries to name) only in a language which keeps us in the hold of what 
we know and through this makes effort at pointing at something other than 
what we know. This is the role of “like” (“For the kingdom of heaven is like 
unto a man that was a householder”), a rhetorical trope deeply entrenched in 
the aporias of similarity and difference and which connects us with generations 
of people who, before us, people of these after-days, made efforts to understand 
their lives. As Bruno Latour says, “It’s always tangentially, together, through 
the cross-ties of an impure, invented language that we finally find the words, 
those rare words that bring about what they say and that connect us […] to 
what our predecessors tried to say” (Latour, 2013: 160). This is the first lesson 
of St. Matthew’s parable: comparison which, as Susan Friedman maintains, is 
“an inevitable mode of human cognition” (Friedman, 2011: 760), suggests the 
way to find “rare” words in which we reestablish a serious, profound contact 
with human efforts to make sense of our living together. Comparison is to 
be understood not only upon the epistemological but also ethical platform. 
The words which we are trying to find are “rare” because they connect not only 
different cultures and times but also but also what seems to be the epitome of 
dis-parity – the realm of the living with the kingdom of the dead. Ulysses knows 
that without establishing such a connection he will not be able to reach home, 
and hence in the XI Book of Homer’s epic he visits the Cimmerian shores and 
speaks to the dead who swarm out of Erebus. In this respect he can be considered 
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the largest, strangest, always growing collective and gives something of the life 
of its own language to the collective, to bring the underground ones to speech” 
(Hamacher, 2010: 998). Marcellus’s plea to Horace in the first act of Hamlet 
urging him to approach the mysterious ghost is strikingly telling: “Speak to him, 
you’re a scholar”. Scholars are those who can and must speak with the dead to 
improve the being together of the living. We may claim that the workers of the 
eleventh hour are those who are particularly aware of this task.
III
The second lesson takes us precisely to the realm of living together for 
which three concepts seems essential: labour, payment, and agreement which 
mediates between the two and secures a peaceful relationship between them. 
The householder, oikodespotes, hires people to do certain work promising them 
a financial remuneration, and this constellation of forces and interests lasts as 
long as the agreement holds. Human world depends then on the subtle balance 
between the work of hands and the truth of a promise, but, as Matthew’s 
parable develops, we notice that it also depends on the manner in which we 
interpret the promise of truth upon which hinges the agreement regulating 
the organization of human world. The interpretation of those who came first 
is different from those who came last; protoi do not conceive of the nature of 
the agreement in the way in which eschatoi do. From this it follows that if our 
living together proceeds from the system of rules which Matthew summarily 
calls the “agreement” (the Greek word used by Matthew can also be rendered 
in English as “sounding together”, “be in harmony with”), then in order to 
understand this agreement we must critically reflect upon it, de-monolithize its 
rules, allowing for differences of interpretation, and to effectuate this we must 
compare reasons and motivations, elucidations and explanations, allegorizations 
and exegeses. This is a wide project which takes us a long way. It refers to the 
matters intra-human but, at the same time, it opens our thinking towards 
matters supra-human, or rather non-human, including both the animal and 
divine. Let us remember that Matthew’s Basileia ton Ouranon uses the word 
“kingdom” only to respect the Jewish reluctance to openly name “God” in the 
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the supremacy and independence of the intra-human world, and this breach 
owes its energies to the activity of comparing. Roberto Esposito quotes August 
Comte’s judgment upon the undoing of the anthropocentric prejudice, the 
judgment in which the notion of comparison looms large as the proposition of 
a new methodology of a non-anthropocentric philosophy: “It is a very irrational 
disdain – writes Comte – which makes us object to all comparison between 
human society and the social state of the lower animals. This unphilosophical 
pride arose out of the protracted influence of the theological-metaphysical 
philosophy” (Esposito, 2012: 32). Comparison would not only invite us to 
investigate the nature and various interpretations of the agreement regulating 
intra-human matters but would make us aware that no serious change can be 
introduced in the state of human affairs unless we relate them to the sphere of 
the non-human. This is, at least in part, parallel to Hans Blumenberg’s emphasis 
on myth as a force reemerging ultimately from underneath the lay structures 
of human-all-too-human history. As Roberto Esposito argues, “[...] when the 
underlying stratum of history is opened up, the language of myth resurfaces in 
all its vital and mortal ambivalence” (Esposito, 2012: 209).
IV
Lesson three deals with what is at the heart of the agreement, of this 
strange contract that, if working well, holds people together and makes them 
speak in harmony. In most general terms we describe it as “justice”. When the 
people of the early hour endorse the agreement, they are hoping to be treated 
differently from those who will come at the eleventh hour. It is a question of 
a connection between time and labour and the balance holding them together, 
the balance which ought to regulate further actions, if they are to earn the 
name of rightness. Justice and rightness depend upon comparing because only 
setting one action against another, one word against another, one text against 
another, can we claim that one is rightful whereas the other is not, one is good 
the other is bad. This rightness is formulated in the order of promise; as the 
householder says to his workers “whatsoever is right I will give you”, and we 
firmly believe that this “whatsoever is right” will result from not so much placing 
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but when provided with the unlimited leeway it may undo the society which 
it wanted to harmoniously construct. When limited to this kind of operation, 
comparing works with a negative slant, i.e. it includes by excluding, it offers 
justice to one by punishing bad deeds but not necessarily by rewarding good 
and making up for wrong actions. The labourers of the early hour, interested 
in determining a common measure to all human actions, the measure which 
supports the present model of reality based upon comparison which serves as 
another name of competition, want to question the agreement which forms the 
basis of our living together not so much struggling on behalf of good but, rather, 
investigating the wrong which supposedly has been done to them (“And when 
they received it, they murmured against the householder”). This is why the 
householder responds to their complaints, ”Friend, I do thee no wrong: didst 
not thou agree with me for a shilling?” The point is not so much to do justice but 
to do no wrong. More than truth, we need to know how not to do wrong. Thus, 
we have to think senses of comparing other than mere setting one action against 
another. The ethics of comparative activity: we compare in order to learn how 
not to do wrong, i.e. to learn humbleness and shame.
V
It is now that we come to the people of the eleventh hour. They do not 
respond to the situation by arguing about equality and justice. This is the job 
of those who came early and who, not unjustly in the routinely accepted sense 
of justice, feel exploited and cheated (“These last have spent but one hour, 
and thou hast made them equal unto us, who have borne the burden of the 
day and the scorching heat”). Their understanding of justice paradoxically 
excludes equality, they believe in the equality of not equal. But their actions 
are not quite “theirs” but those dictated to them by what they consider to be 
law, the strongest of the received structures in which we have organized our 
world and our living together. Those who work under the sign of the eleventh 
hour respond to the challenge differently. They do it by “going their way”, 
i.e. they respect the “agreement” not in its juridical and legalistic sense which 
wants to detect the wrong and penalize its perpetrator. They comprehend 
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householder who, from the point of view of our argument, stands close to the 
late comers, who in fact is one of them, acts precisely on the strength of the 
“agreement”: the equality he speaks of is that of the promise, the equality-to-
come, not its mere human version founded upon resentment and the dead 
letter of the law. The householder also “compares”, but he realizes that the point 
of comparison does not reside in finding a common measure and answering 
questions concerning what is good and bad but precisely in raising questions 
about good and evil, the wrong and the good, as they exist in the world organized 
by the human being. In this case the law does not abdicate, but it does not block 
and paralyze a reflection which each individual ought to dedicate to the matters 
which normally we mechanically relegate to decisions of the law. This is how 
we understand the householder’s dictum “Is it not lawful for me to do what 
I will with mine own? or is thine eye evil, because I am good?” Lawful is what 
I do with “my own”, that is, my actions result from my consideration of many 
issues in question rather than from the routine which wants us to tread in the 
footsteps of what has always been thought and done. The question then is not 
“what is justice?” but “what do I do with justice?” Comparing in this mode 
reduces automatisms of our responses and necessitates our own reflexivity upon 
the vital questions of our lives.
VI
The ethics of the householder and of the people of the eleventh hour 
conceives of justice and equality not as a stabilization of the status quo but 
as its shake-up. The main precept of this ethics reads hoi eschatoi protoi kai 
hoi protoi eschatoi, “So the last shall be first, and the first last”, and we should 
understand it less as a dictate of revolution and more as an attempt to introduce 
love and hope into the ways in which organize our living together, ways 
which are normally regulated by the law. No wonder that those who belong 
to the early hour “murmur” in disappointment. “There is something inside of 
love – its enclosure in a world of duality – that essentially contradicts justice” 
(Esposito, 2012a: 123). They do not comprehend the “you” with which the 
householder addresses them and tries to neutralize the petrifying glance of the 
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whereas they take it to mean the term of aggressive dismissal. “So the last shall 
be first, and the first last”, from the last to the first: from the mechanical and 
mechanistic application of the rule and principle to a thoughtful and always 
risky and challenging reflection upon the rule, reflection which frequently 
entails transgression. In  the logic of William Blake: “You never know what 
is enough unless you know what is more than enough”, and “One Law for 
the Lion & Ox is Oppression” (Blake, 1969: 152, 158). The late comer may 
himself/herself tacitly endorse the structure of reality, but the critical analysis 
of the socio-political ordering always starts with the late comers. The ethics of 
the eleventh hour, the ethics of the last ones, of those who come late, works 
on the utopistic (not utopian) level: it shows distant, fantasmatic forms of 
the democracy towards which we should be moving but which, for their own 
advantage, will not materialize. If they did, they would be no more than mere 
embodiments of utopia, and history has supplied us with ample evidence 
that there is nothing worse than a fulfilled utopia. We claim that comparing is 
a practice of thinking which does not merely endorse the givenness of the world order 
but which is aware of what Radhakrishnan calls the “utopian-transcendent urge to 
imagine otherwise” (Radhakrishnan, 2003: vi). Another lesson of St. Matthew’s 
parable consists in its insistently urging us “to imagine otherwise”.
VII
Before we hear the ultimate message of “So the last shall be first, and the 
first last”, we should not miss what seems to constitute a necessary prelude 
to this proclamation which urges people to be men of the road. Aron ton son 
kai hypage, “Take up that which is thine, and go thy way”, criticizes people 
of the early hours for obstinately clinging not so much to their rights but to 
their imaginary suppositions. To belong to the eleventh hour means not to 
“suppose” but to be on the way, to be closer to the road rather than to the law. 
Edgar Morin articulates the difference between the two: “[…] the law (la loi) 
is frequently an obstacle for the way (la voie) because to be immobile lies in the 
very nature of the law, whereas the way must be dynamic” (Morin, Ramadan, 
2014: 264). This is why the people of the eleventh hour, the ones who are on 
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and inaccurate to claim that they reject law, deny it and transform themselves 
into outlaws. What people of the eleventh hour, and the householder whose 
actions puts them in the center of our attention, do is they reject the view of 
anything as monolithic which is exactly the natural tendency of the law which 
looks at human individual and human society as monoliths subjected to the 
operations of one system. The relationship with the law is “problematic”, i.e. 
people of the eleventh hour view the law precisely not as a solution to the 
problem but as one of the crucial factors contributing to it. They undertake 
a critique of the law and support what Blanchot calls “for ever greater justice” 
(Blanchot, 2010: 165).1 They act on behalf of the way, that is, they want to 
demonstrate limitations of the law, the treason which the law commits in the 
very process of its own formation, against its own principle of justice. Thus, 
“the way has to break the law in order to make new laws possible” (Morin, 
Ramadan, 2014: 264); to speak on behalf of those who belong to the eleventh 
hour implies contestation of the blind legalism of the law. We should certainly 
hear this message in the householder’s instruction given to one of the first ones: 
“Take up that which is thine, and go thy way”. If the command is obeyed, it 
will translate the addressee from the regime of the first hour to the the order 
of the eleventh.
VIII
People of the early hours hold on to their own suppositions because they 
believe they know; they are convinced there is a common measure to everything, 
the measure which serves as the foundation of justice and equality. These two 
virtues hinge upon a system of power which aims at restraining man’s desires 
and securing the political structure able to impose and maintain the order. 
As Dante puts it in the 16th Canto of Purgatory: man has to construct laws 
controlling the course of human passions and install a king who, illuminated 
by the truth, would control the course of public history: Onde convenne legge 
per fren porre; convenne rege aver, che discernesse de la vera cittade almen la torre. 
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Hence the labourers of the early hour compare themselves with others from 
and on the platform of order and knowing. The comparison we postulate in this 
essay, however, inevitably has to elaborate on man but not from the point of 
what it knows about himself/herself but from the place where such knowledge 
is suspended and where the light of truth is dimmed, if not absent. This evokes 
what Leopardi called a position of “half philosophy” (mezza filosofia) which 
Esposito enlarges upon as thinking “concerned with protecting people from the 
brutal impact with the truth that early modern thought confronted without 
caring about consequences [...]”, a thinking which does not want to delude 
itself “that illusion can be dispensed with” (Esposito, 2012: 127). Similarly, 
Werner Hamacher commenting upon Hölderlin’s famous line Gibt es auf Erden 
ein Maaβ? Es gibt keines, points at limitations of anthropology which stems 
from this discipline’s firm conviction that “it thinks it knows that man is the 
unshakeable certainty of the subject and as such the measure of all things” 
(Hamacher, 2010: 997). Hamacher’s next move is to open the inexorable gap 
between language and what is ineffable.”But asking about man exposes this 
certainty to a language that offers no measure of man and thus no measure of 
anything at all”. The householder and the labourers of the eleventh hour then 
mainly ask about man; this is what is meant by the householder’s command 
”Take up that which is thine, and go thy way”. 
IX
These ways are obviously numerous, as each road constantly designs and 
redesigns itself. This implies that we have to deal with a dispersion of measures 
which, in turn, allows us to infer that now, when comparing, our task is not to 
find a common measure but rather to be able to work on the connectivity of all 
the dispersed elements and fragments no longer ordered by one common rule. 
Edgar Morin observes that one of the problems of late modernity is a waning 
ability to connect (relier) scattered grains of reality. His philosophical war 
cry is a plea for relatedness which would not only connect separate atoms of 
experience but would restore reliability to the structures we give to our world. 
Morin presents himself as a thinker obsessed with the problem of reliance, 
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and dispersed experiences” (innombrables expériences spontanées et dispersées) 
(Morin, Ramadan, 2014: 220). No wonder that he formulates his programme as 
De la reliance, encore la reliance, toujours de la reliance. Comparison, as practiced 
by the householder and men of the eleventh hour, means always asking about 
man, that is – refusing to be satisfied with the arrogations of the human measure 
and never tiring at weaving webs of connectivity between the dispersed atoms 
of reality. We wish to refer to this kind of comparison which connects without the 
combative competitiveness inter-paring. It is in this manner that reading connects 
with the world and may lead to a new, more sensitive politics. With a little 
help from Gayatri Spivak, we could claim that the task of inter-paring is: “to 
realize that the literary text in isolation does not lead directly to savvy politics” 
(Spivak, 2003: 53). 
Yet another way of putting it is suggested by the situation in the vineyard 
parable: it is energized by the inbuilt comparison mechanism – we cannot 
help setting those who started working at six in the morning with those who 
were hired in the late afternoon. When the latter appear, they already stand 
in reference to the former. Without this machinery of relatedness the parable 
would not work. Jean-Luc Nancy sees it as a feature of human finitude, since, 
as claims, “finitude co-appears or compears and can only compear” (Nancy, 1991: 
28). If we remain within the circle of comparing which tries to relate the two 
elements with regard to a third party or agency (this is what we do when we 
react with angry astonishment to the householder’s decision which we qualify as 
“unjust”), we will not be able to think of a world organized along lines different 
from those holding now. The grammar of such comparison is A versus B, one 
against the other; such a grammar frames a vision of the world as continuous 
war and accentuates a profound separatedness of the people of the first hour 
from those of the eleventh. They have literally nothing “in common” with each 
other because so much of the human “other” has been usurped by the impersonal 
and abstract law with which it is impossible to have anything “in common”. 
The “common” has become an external system which neutralizes the “other” by 
taking over his/her role and barring him/her from existential questions. This is 
a good example of what Anthony Giddens calls “sequestration of experience” 
(Giddens, 2002: 317), a situation in which the institutional system of reflexivity 
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we understand and conceive of our existence. The world cannot be transformed 
but sinks more and more deeply within the hitherto existing familiar structures. 
The task if inter-parison is (1) o imagine otherwise, (2) to probe into the nature 
of justice and equality, (3) make us abandon all kinds of safety devices provided 
by our ordering of the world and in this way open space for the reflection upon 
cardinal questions of our own existence.
X
In St. Matthew’s narrative the speaking roles are distributed unevenly: 
the householder speaks, and so do the people of early hours. Those who live 
under the auspices of the eleventh hour remain silent. Inter-parison wants 
to understand this silence, but the only way to approach this task is through 
speaking, exercising proper care and maintaining appropriate distance. We do 
not hear their voices because they are no longer here, as, anticipating the 
householder’s admonition, they “went their way”. People of the eleventh hour 
never take positions and never settle down building embankments around their 
living quarters; they do not belong to the regime of the law but to the open space of 
the way. They, like Walt Whitman, may be singing songs of the road but are 
unlikely to make propositional statements or indulge in juridical arguments. 
Anything they say and predicate about various issues and objects forms 
a certain knowledge which derives from an impossible position in which all 
knowledge is suspended and made tentative. Montaigne wanted to speak from 
such an unmappable position in his essays in which he looks for ignorance forte 
et genereuse. This is why the people of the eleventh hour remain silent; they 
deal with the “rest” which is always left out from all kinds of knowledge, the 
rest which is, as Shakespeare well knew, silent but which has to be somehow 
articulated. This strange articulation of the silent “rest” is what constitutes the 
terrain and activity of inter-paring. It is “the area in which philology moves and 
changes itself ” (Hamacher, 2010: 998).
It is the labourers of the early hours that are making a legal case saying, 
“These last have spent but one hour, and thou hast made them equal unto us, 
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pare, while their eleventh hour counterparts inter-pare, work amidst empty 
spaces without the privilege of any decisive destination which would terminate 
their labours. These empty spaces, a result of the interpositional position of 
inter-paring, open space for the future, a different future, they welcome what-
is-to-come
XI
Hence, the patron writers of the labourers of the eleventh hour are masters 
of the hyphon, champions of the unsaid, such as Emily Dickinson or Edgar 
Allan Poe, who did not wish, by offering any decisive formulae for the present, 
to close it off against the future. It is this openness towards the future which 
marks comparing as inter-paring. This is also what is philology as redefined by 
Werner Hamacher who claims that signs of spacing such as comma for example 
“[…] may also hint at that which is not asserted but is called and invited to 
come. Philology would then be attention to that which interpunctuates, brings 
to a hold, creates ceasuras, because within it something that comes – or is 
coming – becomes noticeable” (Hamacher, 2010: 1000). The last fragment 
of Hamacher’s statement is particularly significant: in the act of inter-parison 
there appears something which is coming, something which is not finished, not 
completed, the imperfect object which only announces itself, promises itself 
to us as a special guest. It is noticeable only in such an imperfect grammatical 
mode, because when it will have come, it would have been intercepted by the 
organized world order, and thus become a part of the dominant structure. 
What is coming undoes what already IS, which corresponds to our sense of 
comparing as inter-paring, and in this way runs parallel to what Gayatri Spivak 
envisages as the mission of “the new Comparative Literature”: “Just as socialism 
at its best would persistently and repeatedly wrench capital from capitalism, so 
must the new Comparative Literature persistently and repeatedly undermine 
and undo the definitive tendency of the dominant to appropriate the emergent” 
(Spivak, 2003: 100). This helps us to define inter-paring as the reading activity 
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XII
The task of inter-parison is asking. Inter-paring we treat all answers as 
tentative and temporary, sooner or later to be undermined by the energy of 
interrogation. It is the force of the question, always opening fissures in the 
seemingly solid and smooth surface of the answer, always working in the 
interstices and interspaces, which is responsible for putting it in the service of the 
carnivalesque and spiritual. Inter-paring works between texts in order to disclose 
the force of the spiritual aenesthetized and occluded by the impositions of the 
materiality of life on the one hand and religion regressing to the position of sheer 
orthodoxy of the definitive answer on the other. Tariq Ramadan’s judgment of 
contemporary Islam can be extended over upon the Christian West. According 
to the Arab philosopher, religious discourse “has too often lost its substance, 
which is that of meaning, of understanding ultimate goals and the state of the 
heart. Increasingly, it has been reduced to reactivity, preoccupied with the moral 
protection of the faithful, based on the reiteration of norms, rituals and, above 
all, prohibitions” (Ramadan, 2012: 141). Inter-parison constitutes a whole 
spectrum of readings which try to regain the force of meaning as a quest, as 
a serious and never-ending questioning process, which aims at empowering man 
not to find but search for sense independent of agencies and institutions which 
present themselves as lords and distributors of meaning. Thus, inter-parison 
opens also inter- (rather than post-)secular and inter-divine space in which 
the world can be reconceived in the utopistic way in which the gap between 
the political and ethical, power and spirit, has been envisioned as unnecessary, 
reductive and reactive. We need to remember Coomaraswamy’s statement 
that God is meaning which echoes Rumi’s claim that the world of spirit is the 
world of meaning (alam-i ma’na) (Nasr, 2010: 418). Inter-paring, we bring 
to light the predicament of contemporary culture and life spread between the 
awareness that “the struggle for power has sometimes eclipsed the quest for 
meaning” and the conviction that “the quest for meaning and peace of heart 
[rather than mere protective shell of prohibitions and dogmas] is the essence 
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XIII
Can we then see ourselves and our future in categories transcending 
those which we have produced so far and imposed upon ourselves in our 
history? Is there a “rest” which somehow grounds these categories and which 
has been eclipsed by them? What is this “rest” which they both reveal and hide, 
manifest and suppress? The rest which will have to be awakened and activated. 
The language that still is asleep. Werner Hamacher maintains that “philology 
is the Trojan horse in the walls of our sleeping languages. If they awaken” 
(Hamacher, 2010: 1000), and it is not incidental that the sentence ends with 
a comma; i.e. does not really end, as it is only in this way that we may gain access 
to the interstices among words, we may descend towards the hidden and silent 
meaning, and the task of such a philology, which remarkably coincides with 
what we call here inter-parison, is to bring “the underground ones to speech” 
(Hamacher, 2010: 998). We should carefully notice the frequency with which 
Matthew reiterates the adjective “idle” in his narrative. As in the act of inter-
parison the most important issue is not to merely juxtapose various elements but 
make them work. To inter-pare means to activate what has been dormant and 
thus inactive. Bringing the underground ones to speech names the effort which 
is at the center of inter-paring – intensifying and making truthful the sense of 
living together which must mean working with words of those who preceded 
us, words which “spoken by the generations that came before us and which 
we need to make truthful in turn, just as they made those of their predecessors 
truthful by twisting them thoroughly through a series of elaborations the devil 
alone can make us take for simple lies” (Latour, 2013: 117).
XIV
Norman O. Brown in his last book gives an example of such inter-parative 
effort working in the fissures between Christianity and Islam, secularity and 
religion, literality and metaphor. Brown’s ambition by twenty years precedes 
Hamacher’s: to reactivate and bring back to life imagination as a force able to 
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our ways of living together. Like Hamacher, Brown also redefines the task 
of philology, and sees it in the hermeneutic attempt which allows us to see 
the spirit of prophecy underneath the dominant tone of philology. Looking 
for inspiration in Spinoza’s Tractatus Theologico-Politicus Brown approaches 
prophecy “as a rational or scientific investigation of […] the principle of 
irrationality in human affairs. It is reason examining its own opposite, faith; 
it is philosophy confronting its own opposite, prophecy, and recognizing in 
prophecy the fundamental form of the principle of authority in human affairs” 
(Brown, 1991: 96). Unable to do justice here to Brown’s detailed and attentive 
reading of 18th Sura of the Koran, suffice it say that it highlights two points 
important for inter-paring: (1) the connectivity which allows for incorporating 
the Koranic text into a rich constellation of other texts thus demonolithizing 
Islam, and (2) demonstrating that such a task is possible only if we suspend the 
traditional reading of history as a chronological sequence of events ultimately 
resulting in the teleological structure, be it the Christian Second Coming, 
Marxist dissolution of the state, or Hegelian the Cunning of Reason leading 
up to the embodiment of the spirit of history in the Prussian state. Radicalism 
of the prophetic spirit, as the radicalism of Hamacher’s philology, and Spivak’s 
new planetary Comparative Literature, consists in the apocalyptic breaking up 
of the teleological chain, disrupting it, so that events, texts, words, losing their 
original context, would open up to the unpredictable laws of connectivity. On the 
strength of these laws readiness to form new relatedness spells the end of the 
relations holding right now and thus puts the “end” in the immediate vicinity 
of the “beginning”. As Brown claims, “The Koran backs off from that linear 
organization of time, revelation, and history which became the backbone 
of orthodox Christianity and remains the backbone of the Western culture 
after the death of God. Islam is wholly apocalyptic or eschatological, and its 
eschatology is not teleology [...]; eschatology can break out at any moment” 
(Brown, 1991: 86).
XV
People of the eleventh hour remain close to the spirit of apocalypse not 
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also because they are a force through which the accepted, received understanding 
of such fundamental concepts as justice and equality is apocalyptically 
deconstructed. Father Wacław Hryniewicz interrogating the question of “why 
we don’t like people of the eleventh hour?” suggests that it is because we cannot 
understand the workings of God’s mercy which remains in a clear conflict 
with our culture based upon the merely calculative concept of justice in which 
an offense finds a proportionate and adequate punishment, and labour is 
measured by the expense of time necessary to perform it. This logic of frugality 
and maximum economy cannot readily understand the logic of God’s justice 
which works on the model of prodigality if not wastefulness (Hryniewicz, 
2005: 224). The householder certainly “compares”; he knows the difference 
between people of the first and eleventh hour. But his comparing establishes 
an equality which violates all the principles of the justice administered by law. 
No human juridical institution would endorse the householder’s decision; 
nothing could bespeak of such grossly offensive inequality which, however, 
introduces the equality so radical that the human being cannot accommodate 
it. The utopistic (once again, we have to carefully differentiate it from “utopian”) 
equality of a justice towards which we should be moving without hope of ever 
reaching the destination. This is why we have called it “utopistic” – as it never 
can impose its rule in the absolute fashion, it remains a vision which has the 
power to correct at least some of the faults of the present state of our being 
together. In this context inter-paring unfolds itself as a form of thinking which 
is not only, as David Damrosch claimed, “a renewed engagement with national 
traditions and global contexts” (Damrosch, 2003: 327), but also a renewed 
commitment to notions like justice and equality. This renewal implies that in 
one way or another we cannot and do not want to leave things the way they have 
been. R. Radhakrishnan, having arrogated elsewhere that “theory cannot be an 
acquiescence in the status quo” (Radhakrishnan, 2003: vi), argues that the very 
activity of comparing is conditioned by the will to change: “Why compare, 
unless the performance of comparison transforms the world and the many 
actors who have volunteered to participate in the project? Why compare, if, 
after the comparison, each actor goes back to her corner to pursue business as 
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XVI
The householder then destabilizes the order not by invalidating its 
categories but by provoking us to ask on what grounds we have granted them 
that dominant position which allows us to assume that from the very comparison 
of the people of the first and eleventh hour must result a better and more 
reasonable claim of the former to justice. Comparison becomes inter-parison 
when the act of setting one element against the other does not determine 
a hierarchy of access to social virtues but, rather, makes those virtues available on 
the basis of equality to all participating agents. It does not eliminate differences 
but significantly transforms their character: now they do not set one element 
against the other but, on the principle of good neighbourhood, put one with the 
other. Now, people of the first are not against but with those of eleventh hour. 
Being-with is a principal level upon which inter-parison operates. Inter-parison 
is then syncretic, it enables us to distinguish, differentiate (Greek krino) but, at 
the same time, it does not prioritize by cancelling or disregarding one of the 
differentiated elements2. It follows then that there can be no limit at which the 
access to justice can be cut; even those coming at the twelfth hour would be 
admitted. Inter-parison is never terminated; it allows for and invites more and 
more texts, and it is precisely this and which constitutes the heart of this kind 
of comparison which seems to be conjunctive in its character. This has been 
noticed by Haun Saussy who, having stated that the and model of comparative 
literature is the alternative to the tree-shaped model of comparatism interpreted 
along evolutionary lines, elucidates that, “Lacking a common substance to which 
the differences among its objects might be reduced, comparative literature has 
grown […] through the lateral construction of linking elements”, and hence the 
task of such an conjunctive operation is not to “discover” meanings but rather 
to “produce” them which “brings experimental quality to comparative literature 
and shows why its virtues are inseparable from its questionable legitimacy” 
(Saussy, 2003: 338–339).
It is this combination of being-with and the and strategy which we find 
behind, for example, Spivak’s writings on Islam in which the deconstructive 
2 I am following here suggestions of Susan Stanford Friedman from her essay „Why Not 




T h e  W o r k e r s  o f  t h e  E l e v e n t h  H o u r. . .
potential of what we call here inter-parison allows for a much more nuanced 
and politically savvy attitude on the whole painfully lacking from the political 
world: “It is altogether appropriate that Comparative Literature should undo 
the politically monolithized view of Islam that rules the globe today, without 
compromising the strong unifying ideology potentially alive in that particular 
cultural formation” (Spivak, 2003: 87). 
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The Workers of the eleventh Hour.  
Philology, comparative Studies, and Living-together
Summary
The essay reads St. Matthews’ parable of the vineyard as a model mechanism of 
comparing.
The “kingdom of heaven” is a realm of sense and order which serves as a directive 
and corrective of our ways here in the earthly kingdoms of these after-days. And yet 
this most important sphere upon which everything seems to depend cannot unfold 
before us, and we have to approach it only indirectly, obliquely. The name of this 
tangential approach is comparison. We can try to understand the ideal organization of 
our living together (this is what, I believe, the “kingdom of heaven” tries to name) only 
in a language which keeps us in the hold of what we know and through this makes 
effort at pointing at something other than what we know. The essay also introduces 
the notion of inter-parison, i.e. a whole spectrum of readings which try to regain the 




T h e  W o r k e r s  o f  t h e  E l e v e n t h  H o u r. . .
aims at empowering man not to find but search for sense independent of agencies and 
institutions which present themselves as distributors of meaning. Thus, inter-parison 
opens also inter- (rather than post-)secular and inter-divine space in which the world 
can be reconceived in the utopistic way in which the gap between the political and 
ethical, power and spirit, has been envisioned as unnecessary, reductive and reactive.
keywords: comparative literature, comparison, philology, utopia, change, prophecy, connec-
tivity
Słowa kluczowe: literatura porównawcza, porównanie, filologia, utopia, zmiana, proroctwo, 
łączliwość
